The symbiotic relationship of hash and AEAD

❝Observations on combining a cryptographic hash function and AEAD.❞

AEAD and hash function independently are useful cryptographic concepts. A few days ago, I was looking into an interesting and somewhat curious concept called “time-lock encryption”, and starting pondering the added benefits of combining hash and AEAD, i.e using them as a single construct. There does not seem to be much information on this, at least based on a quick search. Most likely because it is too trivial in nature. However, being curious, I decided to look into it myself.

Disclaimer: I am not a cryptographer. I am curious about cryptographic concepts. I might make seemingly-obvious mistakes, derive wrong conclusions, etc. So be critical as you read this.

SHA-256 (Hash) + AES-256-GCM (AEAD)

The initial combination I looked at was SHA256+AES-256-GCM. This choice is purely based on convenience as both primitives are readily available in the Go standard library.

The construction looks as follows:

 password → [SHA-256] ↴ (key)
  │     plaintext → [AES-256-GCM] → ciphertext
  └ (associated data) ⬏

Or stated differently, given:

Combined as: ciphertext = aes256gcm(plaintext, password, sha256(password), nonce)

password is input for the hash-function. The hash-function output is used as encryption key. In addition, password is added as associated data to the AEAD.

Authenticated-Encryption with Associated-Data describes the following property, among others: (emphasis mine)

(2) It is outside of the model how the associated-data H is made known to the receiver. We do not consider the associated-data to be part of the ciphertext, though the receiver will need it in order to decrypt. The same comments apply the nonce N.

Both hash and AEAD benefit from this construction:

  1. AEAD is bound to the context, in this case the hash function that is part of the construction.
  2. The hash function, used independently, suffers from possibility of second pre-images given a sufficiently large input space. By using the hash function’s input as associated data, second pre-images can no longer usefully contribute. That is, the hash value may be correct, but the necessary associated data is still unavailable.

Hash function and AEAD become co-dependent.


An AEAD provides several guarantees: integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. The ciphertext is guaranteed all three properties.

The associated data is part of the authentication guarantee of the ciphertext. The associated data is turned into a necessary condition to decrypting the ciphertext. If the ciphertext is taken out of this context, decryption becomes infeasible. As an added benefit, the associated data itself is guaranteed integrity.

It is the authenticity and integrity properties that ensure that the original associated data is provided.


A quick reminder: the properties of cryptographic hash functions, according to Wikipedia.

Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value h it should be difficult to find any message m such that h = hash(m). This concept is related to that of a one-way function. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to preimage attacks.

Second pre-image resistance: Given an input m1, it should be difficult to find a different input m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2). This property is sometimes referred to as weak collision resistance. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second-preimage attacks.

Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find two different messages m1 and m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2). Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash collision. This property is sometimes referred to as strong collision resistance. It requires a hash value at least twice as long as that required for pre-image resistance; otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack.

Now to evaluate the properties of the hash function as part of the construction:

Effectively, we have mitigated one limitation of hash functions.


To conclude, the associated data of an AEAD can be used to “cement” a construct in place, such that it cannot be taken apart. The pair (hash, AEAD) is a trivial example which demonstrates a symbiotic relationship.

Further investigation

Although this construction gives a nice benefit, it is important to look at the implications of its application. Hash functions are not ideal for key derivation as hash functions are designed to be fast. This property primarily benefits the attacker.

The broader class of Key Derivation Functions provides options that are more attractive for deriving keys from passwords. It would be interesting to see if those functions can benefit in the same way.

There are a few further questions to look into: